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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
William Thomas Scott, Jr. appeals from the judgment of conviction finding him 
guilty of delivery of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school, following a jury 
trial. Mr. Scott asserts that unobjected to prosecutorial misconduct during closing 
arguments, including repeated indirect references to his failure to testify at trial, violated 
his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, constituted fundamental error, and must 
result in the reversal of his conviction. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Scott was charged with delivery of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of 
a school (R., pp.65-66), following a controlled drug buy conducted by confidential 
informant Theresa Staker. 1 Ms. Staker had entered into an agreement to act as a 
confidential informant after being charged with "[p]ossession with intent to deliver" 
methamphetamine. In exchange for becoming a confidential informant, the State 
reduced her charge to possession and allowed her to participate in drug court. Acting in 
her capacity as an informant, Ms. Staker telephoned Mr. Scott, and arranged to 
purchase one-sixteenth of an ounce of methamphetamine2 for "about [$]150." 
Ms. Staker met with Mr. Scott, and received a bag of what she believed was 
methamphetamine.3 (Tr., p.48, L.2-p.73, L.13, p.79, L.13-p.82, L.5.) 
1 Ms. Staker was called to testify at trial, and, as such, her identity is no longer 
confidential. 
2 Ms. Staker testified that she didn't actually request a specific drug, explaining, "I didn't 
exactly say [what type of drug], but it was implied." (Tr., p.57, Ls.8-10.) 
3 Mr. Scott continues to dispute his guilt as to the charged offense; this version of 
events is based on the trial testimony of Ms. Staker. 
1 
No one other than Ms. Staker witnessed the transaction to which she testified 
(Supp.Tr. 4 , p.33, L.1 - p.34, L.2 (prosecutor acknowledging that no one other than 
Ms. Staker testified to having seen Mr. Scott in the car involved in the delivery); 
Tr., p.105, Ls.15-17 (Detective Bell testifying that he "was unable to see a transaction"); 
Tr., p.124, Ls.4-6 (Detective Horak testifying that he didn't recall seeing the suspect's 
vehicle during his surveillance)), although officers did recover a bag of suspected 
methamphetamine from her car following the purported transaction. 5 (Tr., p.66, Ls.6-
18.) The location of the purported transaction was within 1,000 feet of a junior high 
school. (Tr., p.155, Ls.2-9.) 
Mr. Scott neither presented any defense witnesses nor testified on his own 
behalf. (Tr., p.199, L.24 - p.200, L.1.) In closing argument, the State six times referred 
to its case as undisputed or uncontradicted. (Supp.Tr., p.29, L.9 - p.37, L.2.) In closing 
argument, defense counsel argued that the State had not proven its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt, especially in light of Ms. Staker's interest, pursuant to her 
cooperation agreement, in seeing Mr. Scott convicted. (Supp.Tr., p.37, L.5 - p.43, 
L.20.) In its rebuttal closing argument, the State made two more references to the 
evidence not being contradicted. (Supp.Tr., p.50, Ls.5-7.) The jury found Mr. Scott 
guilty of delivery of a controlled substance and that the delivery occurred within 1,000 
feet of a school. (R., pp.283-84.) 
The State requested that Mr. Scott receive a unified sentence of ten or twelve 
years, with five years fixed. (Tr., p.210, Ls.7-10.) Defense counsel requested that the 
4 Supp.Tr. refers to the transcripts of the hearing on Mr. Scott's motion to modify the 
plea agreement and of closing arguments, which was prepared following Mr. Scott's 
Motion to Augment and Suspend. 
5 The substance was later confirmed, through laboratory testing, to be 
methamphetamine. (Tr., p.43, Ls.8-11.) 
2 
district court impose the mandatory five-year-fixed sentence, or, in the alternative, a 
unified sentence of seven or eight years, with five years fixed. (Tr., p.211, Ls.17-24.) 
Ultimately, the district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five years 
fixed. (Tr., p.216, Ls.8-15.) Mr. Scott filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the Judgment 
of Conviction and Order. (R., p.303.) 
3 
ISSUE 
Did the State's arguments - eight times - that its evidence was uncontradicted or 
undisputed constitute fundamental error in violation of Mr. Scott's Fifth Amendment right 
not to testify? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
The State's Arguments - Eight Times - That Its Evidence Was Uncontradicted Or 
Undisputed Constituted Fundamental Error In Violation Of Mr. Scott's Fifth Amendment 
Right Not To Testify 
A. Introduction 
"[T]he Fifth Amendment ... forbids either comment by the prosecution on the 
accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt." 
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). "Indirect references to the defendant's 
failure to testify are constitutionally impermissible if 'the language used was manifestly 
intended to be or was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily 
take it to be a comment on the defendant's failure to testify."' Williams v. Lane, 826 
F.2d 654,664 (ih Cir. 1987) (quoting U.S. v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505, 509 (ih Cir. 1968)). 
The State's eight unobjected-to statements that its evidence was uncontradicted 
or undisputed constituted fundamental error in violation of Mr. Scott's Fifth Amendment 
right not to testify because they amounted to indirect comments on his decision not to 
testify. 
8. The State's Arguments - Eight Times - That Its Evidence Was Uncontradicted 
Or Undisputed Constituted Fundamental Error In Violation Of Mr. Scott's Fifth 
Amendment Right Not To Testify 
"Idaho follows the overwhelming number of jurisdictions holding that a 
prosecutor's general references to uncontradicted evidence do not necessarily reflect 
on the defendant's failure to testify, where witnesses other than the defendant could 
have contradicted the evidence." State v. McMurry, 143 Idaho 312, 314 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(citing Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1987) and Raper v. Mintzes, 706 
F.2d 161, 164 (6th Cir. 1983)) (emphasis in original). In Lincoln v. Sunn, the Court 
noted, "Courts have distinguished between those cases in which the defendant is the 
5 
sole witness who could possibly offer evidence on a particular issue, and those cases in 
which the information is available from other defense witnesses as well." Lincoln, 807 
F.2d at 810. 
In McMurry, the Court noted that whether a prosecutor's comments on the lack of 
defense evidence contradicting the State's case can result in a Griffin violation 
"depend[s] on the number and nature of those comments[,]" and that "[c]ourts uniformly 
condemn this prosecutorial tactic due to the difficulty of determining whether Griffin 
violations are constitutionally harmless." McMurry, 143 Idaho at 314-15 (citing Lincoln, 
Raper, and U.S. v. Castillo, 866 F.2d 1071, 1084 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
In Raper, relied on by the Court in McMurry, the defendant was convicted of, 
inter a/ia, the premeditated, first-degree murder of his estranged wife, Brenda. Raper, 
706 F.2d at 162. The woman's boyfriend, Sam Kobel, was the only eyewitness, and 
testified that Brenda answered the door when the defendant knocked, and that he heard 
her ask "What are you doing here?" and "What do you have that for?" to which there 
was no response. Id. Kobel then heard gunshots, ran toward Brenda, and saw her fall 
to the ground. Id. The main issue of contention at trial was whether the murder of 
Brenda was premeditated, with defense counsel arguing that it was possible that the 
defendant went to the house to throw Kobel out (by threatening him with the gun), and 
that he only killed Brenda in a moment of rage. Id. at 165. 
The prosecutor, in his rebuttal closing argument, repeatedly stated that the 
testimony of what happened was uncontradicted. Id. at 165-66. The prosecutor's 
argument included stating, 'The facts were presented, and no one contradicted anything 
that Sam Kobel said. No witness contradicted it. The physical facts don't contradict it." 
Id. at 165. The prosecutor went on to argue, "His testimony has just not been refuted. 
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It's not been contradicted." Id. Later, the prosecutor argued, "Let's look at Howard 
Samuel Kobel's testimony. No one's disputed it in any sense ... No one, no one 
witness has contradicted the testimony, the events of that evening as relayed to you by 
Sam Kobel."6 Id. at 166. 
Although the prosecutor's comments did not directly state that the defendant had 
not testified, the Court nonetheless held that it was "unable to conceive of any other 
reasonable inference which could be drawn from the prosecutor's comments)! because 
only the defendant could have contradicted the government's evidence. 706 F.2d at 
166-67. The Court also found it significant that the prosecutor "made at least five 
indirect references to the [defendant]'s failure to testify." Id. at 167. Ultimately, the 
Court concluded that "the fact that the prosecutor made repeated comments about the 
uncontradicted nature of the evidence is the dispositive factor in this case." Id. The 
Court reversed the first degree murder conviction, finding that the error was not 
harmless. Id. at 167. 
In this case, only two people were present at the time of the purported drug 
transaction: the police informant and Mr. Scott. Since the informant testified, that left 
only one person who could have contradicted the evidence presented: Mr. Scott. The 
State did not merely refer to its overall case as uncontroverted; rather it mentioned 
specific instances and argued that the evidence was uncontroverted or undisputed at 
least eight times. The following are the eight instances from the State's closing and 
rebuttal arguments in which the prosecutor indirectly commented on Mr. Scott's silence: 
The evidence is undisputed, uncontradicted that this controlled buy 
happened on that date. 
6 In Raper, as in Mr. Scott's case, the prosecutor's comments were not objected to by 
defense counsel. Raper, 706 F.2d at 163. 
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(Supp.Tr., p.29, Ls.19-29.) 
Number two, in the State of Idaho. That evidence is also uncontradicted. 
It was confirmed by a number of witnesses that the controlled buy 
happened in Cassia County, in the city of Burley, in the State of Idaho, 
even narrowed down to almost the exact place on 13th Street where the 
controlled buy happened. 
(Supp.Tr., p.29, L.22 - p.30, L.3.) 
The only evidence before you is that the substance in question was 
methamphetamine ... [T]hat point is essentially undisputed. 
(Supp.Tr., p.30, Ls.12-21.) 
Also contained within point number three, that it was William Scott, the 
defendant in this case, that delivered that methamphetamine. That 
evidence also is uncontradicted and undisputed. Every witness who had 
any connection to this case as far as the controlled buy or the surveillance 
connected William Scott to that controlled buy in some way. First of all, 
Theresa Staker, very brave initially working as a confidential informant, 
but, of course, because the case had to go to trial, her name had to be 
divulged. She had to testify publicly. Certainly was no longer confidential. 
She had to face Mr. Scott, the man who sold her that methamphetamine, 
and identify him publically in court. She did that, and that identification 
was undisputed. 
(Supp.Tr., p.30, L.22 - p.31, L.12.) 
Her testimony, again, is that he sold her or delivered her 
methamphetamine, and there is no evidence to contradict that. In fact, all 
of the other evidence introduced in this trial corroborates or supports her 
testimony. 
(Supp.Tr., p.31, Ls.20-24.) 
Instruction Number 16 will be the next big question, and that is very 
straightforward, very simple, and that is simply whether the delivery 
occurred within 1,000 feet of the property of any public or private, primary 
or secondary school. Again, the evidence was completely uncontradicted. 
(Supp.Tr., p.36, Ls.1-6.) 
She was being honest. She was telling you what happened, and that 
evidence is uncontradicted. 
(Supp.Tr., p.49, Ls.9-11.) 
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She was under oath. She promised to tell the truth, and there was [no]7 
evidence to contradict that. 
(Supp.Tr., p.50, Ls.5-7.) 
The misconduct engaged in by the State in its closing and rebuttal arguments is 
just what appellate courts have been concerned about since Griffin. As the Court of 
Appeals noted in McMurry, "courts uniformly condemn this prosecutorial tactic due to 
the difficulty of determining whether Griffin violations are constitutionally harmless." 
McMurry, 143 Idaho at 314-15. 
The two key considerations when determining whether a violation has occurred 
are the "number and nature of those comments." Id. In this case, the number of the 
comments, eight, is substantial. This is two more than in Raper, cited by the Court in 
McMurry, and in McMurry itself, in which the Court found four8 indirect references to the 
defendant's silence. See also U.S. v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880, 882 (1 st Cir. 1971) (Three 
unobjected to comments by the prosecutor that a witness' testimony was 
"uncontradicted" required reversal); Rodriguez-Sandoval v. U.S., 409 F.2d 529, 531 (1 st 
Cir. 1969) (Five unobjected to comments by the prosecutor that the government's 
version was uncontradicted constituted plain error and required reversal). 
As for the nature of the comments, they were indirect references to Mr. Scott's 
decision not to testify by their nature because he was the only witness who could have 
contradicted the evidence presented and discussed by the State. See McMurry, 143 
Idaho at 315 ("Comment on the absence of evidence contradicting the state's case is 
7 The transcript appears to be missing the word "no" at this point. 
8 The Court of Appeals explained that McMurry challenged three statements made by 
the prosecutor, all of which had been objected to at trial; the Court itself located and 
discussed a fourth improper comment that was not the subject of an objection. Id. at 
315-16. 
9 
particularly problematic where the defendant is the sole witness who would be able to 
contradict the evidence in question." (emphasis in original)) (citing People v. Hughes, 39 
P.3d 432 (Cal. 2002); Hughes, 39 P.3d at 487 ("Pursuant to Griffin, it is error for a 
prosecutor to state that certain evidence is uncontradicted or unrefuted when the 
evidence could not be contradicted or refuted by anyone other than the defendant 
testifying on his or her own behalf."); State v. Scutchings, 759 N.W.2d 729, 732 (N.O. 
2009) ("[l]t is well established that a prosecutor's comment that the government's 
evidence is uncontradicted or unrebutted is improper and violates the Griffin rule if the 
only person who could have rebutted the evidence was the defendant testifying on his 
or her own behalf." (citations omitted)); State v. Padilla, 552 P.2d 357, 362-63 (Haw. 
1976) ("The prosecution is entitled to call attention to the fact that the testimony of the 
witnesses for the prosecution has not been controverted, unless the circumstance that 
the defendant is the only one who could possibly contradict that testimony would 
necessarily direct the jury's attention solely to the defendant's failure to testify." 
(citations omitted)); J. Evans, Annotation, Comment or Argument by Court or Counsel 
that Prosecution Evidence is Uncontradicted as Amounting to Improper Reference to 
Accused's Failure to Testify, 14 A.L.R. 3d 723, II.§ 4 (1967)9 ("Where a trial judge or a 
prosecuting attorney remarks that evidence offered by the prosecution is 
uncontradicted, and where defendant is the only person who could or would have 
contradicted the evidence, it is generally held that the comment refers to defendant's 
failure to testify and is thus improper."). 
9 This A.LR. was cited by the Court of Appeals in McMurry. See McMurry, 143 Idaho at 
315. 
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Although the prosecutorial misconduct in this case was not objected to by 
defense counsel, Mr. Scott asserts that it constituted fundamental error requiring 
reversal of his conviction. In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), the Idaho Supreme 
Court set forth a new standard of review for unobjected to error, explaining: 
If the alleged error was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, it 
shall only be reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho's fundamental 
error doctrine. Such review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the 
defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the 
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists; and (3) was not harmless. If the 
defendant persuades the appellate court that the complained of error 
satisfies this three-prong inquiry, then the appellate court shall vacate and 
remand. 
Id. at 228. 
With respect to the first prong, the prosecutorial misconduct violated Mr. Scott's 
Fifth Amendment right, incorporated against the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, not to testify. As for the second prong, it is plain from the record, as the 
prosecutor uses the terminology - uncontradicted or undisputed - disfavored by the 
Court in McMurry and by other appellate courts considering the issue in a case in which 
the defendant is the only witness who could have contradicted the State's evidence. 
The third prong - establishing that the misconduct was not harmless - requires further 
discussion. 
In State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 1986), the Florida Supreme Court, in 
adopting a harmless error test for prosecutorial comments on a defendant's silence (and 
reversing its precedent that such errors required automatic reversal), nonetheless 
explained that "comments on silence are high risk errors because there is a substantial 
likelihood that meaningful comments will vitiate the right to a fair trial by influencing the 
jury verdict[.}" State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 1986). With respect to the 
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application of a harmless error standard, 10 the Court, adopting the reasoning of former 
Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court, cautioned, 
that harmless error analysis must not become a device whereby the 
appellate court substitutes itself for the jury, examines the permissible 
evidence, excludes the impermissible evidence, and determines that the 
evidence of guilt is sufficient or even overwhelming based on the 
permissible evidence. In a pertinent passage, Chief Justice Traynor 
points out: 
Overwhelming evidence of guilt does not negate the fact that an 
error that constituted a substantial part of the prosecution's case 
may have played a substantial part in the jury's deliberation and 
thus contributed to the actual verdict reached , for the jury may have 
reached its verdict because of the error without considering other 
reasons untainted by error that would have supported the same 
result. 
Id. at 1136 (quoting People v. Ross, 429 P.2d 606, 621 (Cal. 1967) (Traynor, C.J. 
dissenting)). 
In this case, to satisfy the third prong of the Perry test, Mr. Scott need only show 
a "reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial. " Perry, 150 
Idaho at 978. Considering that this case was based almost exclusively on the testimony 
of one drug-addicted, drug-dealing police informant, and that Mr. Scott was the only 
person whose testimony could have contradicted the testimony of the informant, 
Mr. Scott submits that there is a reasonable possibility that the State's eight indirect 
references to his failure to testify affected the outcome of the trial. 
Based on the fundamental error present in his case, which deprived him of his 
Fifth Amendment right to silence, Mr. Scott asserts that this Court must reverse the 
judgment of conviction , and remand his case to the district court for a new trial. 
10 The Florida Supreme Court adopted the harmless error standard set forth in 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), which differs from the Perry test in that, 
under Chapman, the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. 
12 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Scott respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter to the district court for a new 
trial. 
DATED this 20 th day of September, 2011. 
J. HAHN 
te Appellate Public Defender 
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